Abstract: An unprecedented eleven-member UK Supreme Court decided R (Miller)
INTRODUCTION
The highly anticipated decision by the United Kingdom Supreme Court (UKSC) in Miller 1 comes at a critical constitutional moment. Winding up the UK's existing relationship with the EU will also alter the politically sensitive terms and conditions of the devolution settlement between the centre and the regions. It will take years for the full extent of the technical details and political consequences to be worked out, if they ever are. For now, the UKSC was called upon to provide clarity over two considerations: Westminster's constitutional entanglement with the EU and with the devolved legislatures. The UKSC reached the same conclusions as the Divisional Court's ruling on 3 November 2016 with respect to Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), but it does so from a completely different starting point. With respect to EU law, the UKSC makes an unprecedented and audacious statement. With respect to devolution, however, it passes up on a pioneering opportunity for the UK's quasi-federal constitution. It is part landmark ruling, and part dispiriting wavering. The implications of both aspects of the Court's intervention will be re-visited for years to come.
I wish to discuss Miller as an example of the different types of constitutional reasoning that were explored by the US scholar Philip Bobbitt in his book on the topic in 1991. According to Bobbitt, a proper, sound, or legitimate argument is one that uses one of the following modalities historical (relying on the intentions of the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution); textual (looking to the meaning of the words of the Constitution alone, as they would be interpreted by the average contemporary "man on the street"); structural (inferring rules from the relationships that the Constitution mandates among the structures it sets up); doctrinal (applying rules generated by precedent); ethical (deriving rules from those moral commitments of the American ethos that are reflected in the Constitution); and prudential (seeking to balance the costs and benefits of a particular rule). 2 These modalities clearly do not translate neatly into the context of the UK's uncodified constitution; but neither does that hurdle render them unusable as a series of deployable benchmarks. Aside from the prudential argument, the five main forms are methods of interpreting legal texts generally and the text of a constitution in particular. Prudential reasoning does not interpret a text, but considers non-textual matters, such as public policy or the social costs and benefits of particular decisions. The first four modalities -historical, textual, structural, and doctrinal -clearly feature in Miller. In the context of devolution, I will argue that the UKSC might have been guided by ethical reasoning. Instead, possibly due to concerns about over-politicisation, the UKSC relied on prudential reasons for restraint rather than ethical reasons for intervening.
GENIE OUT OF THE BOTTLE
The most astonishing aspect of the Miller decision is the UKSC's conceptualisation of EU law. It marks the culmination of a peculiarly British struggle with the validity of EU law just as its application looks set to end. Lord Denning's 'construction' approach in Macarthys v However, the UKSC's starting point is far from ordinary in a doctrinal sense.
The Government's lawyers did not help their case by placing a weak argument at its core. This rested on the absence of any provision in the ECA that curtailed ministers' prerogative powers to withdraw from international treaties. It followed, the Government claimed, that withdrawing from the EU Treaties under the prerogative was not precluded by the ECA. 23 Lord Reed agrees with this position: since the ECA does not require the UK to be a member of the EU, it also does not affect the Government's power to begin the process of withdrawal without an Act of Parliament. 24 However, the Government's argument was ultimately deemed insubstantial in that it tried to prove a negative by transforming absence of evidence into positive proof of its existence. On the specific question whether the NIA requires specific legislation before Article 50 is required, the UKSC deems it 'not necessary to reach a definitive view' and refrains from finally deciding this question of constitutional law. 47 The UKSC's unanimous approach to textual interpretation in the context of devolution reflects a distinct loss of confidence: it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the judges did not want to determine the devolution question.
On another day, it might have combined structural reasoning with (to recall Bobbitt's fifth modality) ethical motives for intervening. Since 1998, the ethos of the UK constitution has shifted from that of a unitary state with centralised government to that of a quasi-federal state with devolved administration. These new and evolving constitutional arrangements give rise to ethical arguments, which recognise that certain rights, obligations, and interests lie From the UKSC's perspective, therefore, the Sewel Convention is the key constitutional mechanism by which boundary questions between the centre and the regions are framed. The UKSC recognises that some conventions perform 'a fundamental role in the operation of our constitution', and the particular function of the Sewel Convention is to facilitate 'harmonious relationships' between the centre and the regions. 57 It acts as the key to an interlocking and interdependent constitutional structure. It can be used as the mouthpiece for cross-community and cross-border dialogue. However, the Sewel Convention creates no legal obligations, and the UKSC will not police the fundamental role that the convention plays, notwithstanding its statutory form.
The UKSC is speaking here in the coded language of political constitutionalism and, Given the approach it adopted to the issue, the UKSC is undoubtedly correct that the consent of the devolved legislatures is not strictly speaking required for the purposes of triggering Article 50 -or for the purposes of amending the devolution legislation. However, for so long as the Sewel Convention is in place, the devolved assemblies need to pass a legislative consent motion under the Sewel Convention before those parts of the devolution legislation incorporating EU law can be amended. True to British form, recognising this as a constitutional requirement is very different from giving it any legal effect.
In trying to defuse one political bomb by not over-politicising devolution the UKSC may find that it has ignited at least another one. The UKSC's self-perceived need for restraint will be interpreted in the regions as a retreat to constitutional formalism and Westminster intransigence. Withdrawing from the EU will certainly alter the general and special of the prerogative power; 64 at the end of the negotiation process, the procedures of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 'are likely to apply'; and, in any case, Parliament will 'be invited' to enact legislation to complete the formal withdrawal process from the EU.
66
Lord Reed's dissent with respect to the ECA is similarly grounded on a tried and tested understanding of the relationship between EU and national law. First, contrary to the majority view, Lord Reed asserts that EU law is not an independent source of law, but is rather dependent on the UK's rule of recognition. 67 Second, the ECA is a gateway statute that gives effect to the acquis communautaire, but it does not create the kind of rights and obligations that other statutes do. 68 Lord Reed draws a distinction between the validity of the Treaties as a matter of EU law and their application to the UK as a matter of domestic law. If the Treaties cease to apply as a matter of international law (to which the prerogative power applies), then there are no rights, powers etc which could be given legal effect in the UK in accordance with the Treaties. In other words, there is no obligation to give effect to EU law merely because it is directly effective. The ECA is not an independent source of law. It simply gives rise to a 'scheme' by which domestic law dynamically reflects the UK's changing obligations under EU law. That obligation ceases when the Treaties no longer apply. 69 Lord Reed's dissent errs on the side of orthodoxy.
There is nothing wrong with orthodoxy when it is backed up by doctrinal argument.
There is little to distinguish Lord Reed's conceptualisation of EU law from earlier judicial articulations, especially Laws LJ's decision in Thoburn, and Lords Neuberger and Mance's
